We need a Brad Pitt/Michael Jackson/Justin Bieber

[Fragment]

I'd actually even say that you're straw manning Constructivism pretty badly, too. I'm not a fan of Rawls but what would his veil of ignorance/ original position say?

Rawls would ask:
If you didn't know whether you were going to be born a MAP or not how would you say MAPs should be treated?

I don't think that would in any way justify how we are treated now. At a minimum it would lead to normalization of NOMAPs and likely better sentencing of offending MAPs even if not outright legalization.

[PorcelainLark]

Yeah, I don’t think we need to pick between "morality is objective" and "morality isn't real." You're right that pragmatism and constructivism can both justify a bunch of shit if taken too simplistically, but there’s a whole tradition of moral thinking that doesn’t rely on objectivity in a mystical sense, but still lets us challenge the majority.

Think of Hume, Iris Murdoch, Rorty, and David Wong. They all said that morality isn’t objective in the strict sense, but still grounded in a common human nature, emotional capacity, and social relationships. So it’s not just "anything goes subjectivity", or "common sense morality" mob rule. There’s a kind of naturalism there that still lets you say "this is wrong" without pretending there's a cosmic scoreboard.

So I think someone like Atticus Finch works just fine there. You don't need metaphysical realism, you just need enough coherence between your values and how humans actually live and feel. It's not as sturdy as divine command or objective truth, but it still pushes back against cruelty and incoherence. But if your objective law can't be proven or enforced it's not gonna get you far anyway.

Plato and Kant were dicks. And Bentham and Mill overreached. Naturalistic pluralism gives us all we need without conjuring up voodoo.

If that's your view, I think we fundamentally disagree

Metaphysics isn't "voodoo," or intrinsically "mystical." Hume is an emotivist, Murdoch is a Platonist, Rorty a pragmatist, and I have no idea who David Wong is.

Pluralism is arbitrary.

I think Plato and Kant had the right kind of idea even if they were wrong about some of the details and conlusions, and Rorty epitomizes everything wrong with how things are today. There's no "objective reality," so no one can be wrong about anything, everything is just a compromise between what people say; we can't take seriously the idea that people lie, or pretend to believe things that they don't believe.

I too have problems with Bentham and Mill, but I expect they are the inverse of yours. They represent a majoritarian view of the good (greatest pleasure for the greatest number) which is arbitrary in my view, but the goal of universal judgement is right.

I'd actually even say that you're straw manning Constructivism pretty badly, too. I'm not a fan of Rawls but what would his veil of ignorance/ original position say?

Rawls would ask:
If you didn't know whether you were going to be born a MAP or not how would you say MAPs should be treated?

I don't think that would in any way justify how we are treated now. At a minimum it would lead to normalization of NOMAPs and likely better sentencing of offending MAPs even if not outright legalization.

I don't really mind the majority of constructivism, to be honest, I've found Rawls' views sympathetic in the past. It's John Dewey's views that I take issue with. Morality should never be conflated with consensus or democracy, in my view.

[Fragment]

If that's your view, I think we fundamentally disagree

I almost couldn't sleep because I was thinking about my reply to this post. There's a lot to get through.

First of all I never dismissed metaphysics as a discipline. Obviously I have a metaphysical viewpoint. My viewpoint is basically global skepticism in a Humean sense. Objective facts may exist, but we can never know them because we only have epistemic access to subjective experience. Even rationality is bound in finite, human bodies, so it's unclear if things that seems tautological would actually be so if we could step outside of our experience. But I'll rank things by "probability of actually existing outside of human minds":

* Rationally "objective" facts. The laws of mathematics, tautologies, pure logic.
* "Objective "scientific" facts. The laws of physics, observations of natural phenomena.
* Universal human subjectivity. The experience of pain, for example, exists in this tier. It's not objective in any real sense, but as embodied subjective creatures we've evolved it and it's shared across almost all humans.
* Pure subjective preferences. Chocolate vs vanilla, etc.

So when you are talking about objective morality it feels to me like you're talking about the top tier. That's what Kant was aiming to do. He felt that reason alone was enough to derive moral law. I think the very fact that different observers see morals differently, and that different ethical theories claim different moralities as objective is enough to disprove the notion that morals exist in a metaphysically objective sense.

Your claim seems to be that if morality doesn't exist in the first (or second) tier that it must only exist in the fourth tier- pure preference. It seems to ignore the existence of the third tier- that is, naturalism.

Morality is something that can be universalized across human experience, but only because we’re the kinds of creatures we are - not because it’s etched into the fabric of the universe. Moral laws fundamentally depend on our nature as finite, embodied consciousnesses. Many of our "obvious" moral laws aren't actually obvious if we change fundamental parts of human nature.

Take "murder is wrong". Seems universal, right? But why? Because humans are mortal, emotionally attached, socially embedded beings with finite lives and unique, unrepeatable subjectivity. Killing someone is irrevocable. If humans were immortal, or reborn after death with memory intact, the meaning of "killing" would shift. You’re not removing someone from existence- you’re delaying or inconveniencing them. It might still be rude, or disruptive, but it wouldn’t carry the same moral weight. Even our most obvious moral rules depend on the kind of creatures we are. I don't think there's a single ethical theory or moral rule that doesn't rely on emergent properties of "what it is to be human". But universalizable subjectivity is not the same as objectivity- unless you want to use the latter as shorthand for referring to the former.

As for David Wong, he's actually one of the people that's most influenced my thinking in terms of how relativism can still make serious moral claims and why it's not actually arbitrary. His concept is called "pluralistic relativism" and it argues we can have serious moral commitments that have cross-cultural variation without appealing to what Stirner would call "spooks". Our judgements are grounded in shared human needs- the need to avoid suffering, sustain trust, build flourishing. But convergence does not mean objectivity, and expressions of universal human values may differ culturally. As one clear example (and this isn't necessarily a moral value), we can think about "respect for the dead"- it's a universal across human cultures- but how respect for the dead is shown is pluralistic- in some cultures it means cremation, in some it means burial, in others it means leaving the body on a mountain for the crows to eat. From one culture's point of view a different expression could be seen as immoral or distasteful, but they all rely on a shared human value. This is not objectivity, nor is it arbitrary.

While some, like Stirner or Nietzsche, might support "anything goes" relativism, that's not what I support. And it's frustrating that people see it as a binary choice. It's like the debate over free will. People suppose you have to be either a hard determinist or believe in metaphysical free will. But they deny strong compatibilist arguments like those advanced by Daniel Dennett (my favorite living philosopher). You can be a scientifically grounded atheist while still talking about free will or morality in functional, pragmatic senses that can be universalized because of our shared nature as humans. Pluralism is a framework for negotiating which systems work, why, how and for who, based on the social realities we inhabit. And we don't need to assume some extra-human level of reality to make extremely strong normative claims.

I'd even say that a naturalist approach to morality is even stronger than an objective one because it is grounded on a shared reality. As much as you might call an ethical system "objective", the very fact that it's being advanced by a human makes it subjective. And what can it actually do in the face of opposition than say "no, but I'm right!" Naturalism, because it tries to ground its claims in human nature, can actually appeal to that nature when faced with opposite views. "You also care about x, y, z, right? So perhaps you should think about things this way." I feel that objectivity is basically just relativity wearing a mask and pretending to be more than it is.

The other thing I don't like about (most) ethical theories claiming objectivity is that they are single variate- reducing moral reasoning to a single dominant factor. Deontology: only duty matters. Utilitarianism: only utility matters. Virtue ethics, by being multivariate, better captures human nature in this regard. But Aristotle still assumed a supernatural telos and that there was some kind of Platonic, or objective eudaimonia that exists outside of human experience. I dislike Kant, but only because of his excessive prescriptivism. Kant's categorical imperative, if framed more moderately, as one moral value- based on a rational understanding of human experience- and to be weighed against other values, is actually a damn good piece of philosophy. It's his overreach that is so off-putting to me.

If you still have an aesthetic preference for the seeming consistency of objective framing, or believe that it has more pedagogical power, then that is a preference I can respect. But I hope you can see that there is, in fact, a third option- which I see as both more realistic, more accurate and more powerful- between objectivity and nihilism.

[PorcelainLark]

I almost couldn't sleep because I was thinking about my reply to this post. There's a lot to get through.

Sorry about that. Even if I disagree with your perspective, I like you as a person. I should have been less inflammatory.

First of all I never dismissed metaphysics as a discipline. Obviously I have a metaphysical viewpoint.

Fair enough, it was probably unfair stereotyping on my part. I've seen a lot of people say similar things about Kantian metaphysics being arbitrary or "religious." There are certain kinds of dismissals of metaphysics (e.g. positivism, nominalism, Stirner, Heidegger) that I feel people default to without further reading or further thought.

My viewpoint is basically global skepticism in a Humean sense. Objective facts may exist, but we can never know them because we only have epistemic access to subjective experience. Even rationality is bound in finite, human bodies, so it's unclear if things that seems tautological would actually be so if we could step outside of our experience.

The first part sounds Kantian to me (phenomenon versus noumenon). The second has issues, in my view.

* Universal human subjectivity. The experience of pain, for example, exists in this tier. It's not objective in any real sense, but as embodied subjective creatures we've evolved it and it's shared across almost all humans.

That sounds a lot like the concept of "transcendental subjectivity," by the way.

So when you are talking about objective morality it feels to me like you're talking about the top tier. That's what Kant was aiming to do. He felt that reason alone was enough to derive moral law. I think the very fact that different observers see morals differently, and that different ethical theories claim different moralities as objective is enough to disprove the notion that morals exist in a metaphysically objective sense.

Yes, that's basically my view. I think moral conflict either arises from confusion, or from dishonesty (particularly self-interested dishonesty), and that a more clear-headed and honest society would eventually reach a consensus on morality. However, you don't need consensus for something to be true.

We're not there yet, though. I think there are a lot of layers of imaginary things that prevent that (e.g. legal formalities you have to assent to even though you don't necessarily agree with them) and social pressures that mean being honest and clear-headed means you end up being taken advantage of by others.

Your claim seems to be that if morality doesn't exist in the first (or second) tier that it must only exist in the fourth tier- pure preference. It seems to ignore the existence of the third tier- that is, naturalism.

Morality is something that can be universalized across human experience, but only because we’re the kinds of creatures we are - not because it’s etched into the fabric of the universe. Moral laws fundamentally depend on our nature as finite, embodied consciousnesses. Many of our "obvious" moral laws aren't actually obvious if we change fundamental parts of human nature.

Take "murder is wrong". Seems universal, right? But why? Because humans are mortal, emotionally attached, socially embedded beings with finite lives and unique, unrepeatable subjectivity. Killing someone is irrevocable. If humans were immortal, or reborn after death with memory intact, the meaning of "killing" would shift. You’re not removing someone from existence- you’re delaying or inconveniencing them. It might still be rude, or disruptive, but it wouldn’t carry the same moral weight. Even our most obvious moral rules depend on the kind of creatures we are. I don't think there's a single ethical theory or moral rule that doesn't rely on emergent properties of "what it is to be human". But universalizable subjectivity is not the same as objectivity- unless you want to use the latter as shorthand for referring to the former.

Sure, but how can we say whether the judgements about those things are valid or invalid? I think, independent of the empirical particulars of humanity, there has to be a foundation in deontic logic.

As for David Wong, he's actually one of the people that's most influenced my thinking in terms of how relativism can still make serious moral claims and why it's not actually arbitrary. His concept is called "pluralistic relativism" and it argues we can have serious moral commitments that have cross-cultural variation without appealing to what Stirner would call "spooks". Our judgements are grounded in shared human needs- the need to avoid suffering, sustain trust, build flourishing. But convergence does not mean objectivity, and expressions of universal human values may differ culturally. As one clear example (and this isn't necessarily a moral value), we can think about "respect for the dead"- it's a universal across human cultures- but how respect for the dead is shown is pluralistic- in some cultures it means cremation, in some it means burial, in others it means leaving the body on a mountain for the crows to eat. From one culture's point of view a different expression could be seen as immoral or distasteful, but they all rely on a shared human value. This is not objectivity, nor is it arbitrary.

From my perspective, this seems like all the more reason to look at the form of moral judgement rather than it's content. Interesting idea, though.

While some, like Stirner or Nietzsche, might support "anything goes" relativism, that's not what I support. And it's frustrating that people see it as a binary choice.

I can see where you're coming from, since I disagree with "folk" moral realism too. People acting as though they know something is objectively moral, is usually a sign of dogmatism rather than thought.

It's like the debate over free will. People suppose you have to be either a hard determinist or believe in metaphysical free will. But they deny strong compatibilist arguments like those advanced by Daniel Dennett (my favorite living philosopher).

Here's a curveball. What do you think about functionalism versus mechanism regarding causality?

I'd even say that a naturalist approach to morality is even stronger than an objective one because it is grounded on a shared reality. As much as you might call an ethical system "objective", the very fact that it's being advanced by a human makes it subjective.

I mean, you could say that about every claim, mathematical or scientific.

I feel that objectivity is basically just relativity wearing a mask and pretending to be more than it is.

Interesting, I kind of feel it's the inverse. People like Foucault hide global moral claims behind a critique of universality, in my opinion.

The other thing I don't like about (most) ethical theories claiming objectivity is that they are single variate- reducing moral reasoning to a single dominant factor.

I aim towards that; I prefer if theories are elegant.

But Aristotle still assumed a supernatural telos and that there was some kind of Platonic, or objective eudaimonia that exists outside of human experience.

What do you have in mind when you say "supernatural?"

I dislike Kant, but only because of his excessive prescriptivism. Kant's categorical imperative, if framed more moderately, as one moral value- based on a rational understanding of human experience- and to be weighed against other values, is actually a damn good piece of philosophy.

Fair enough. By the way, you might quite like WD Ross' idea of prima facie duties, if you haven't already heard of it. It's a kind of pluralistic deontology that combines elements of Aristotle with Kant. If I wasn't so concerned with theoretical elegance, I'd probably be a follower of Ross.

If you still have an aesthetic preference for the seeming consistency of objective framing, or believe that it has more pedagogical power, then that is a preference I can respect.

I aim towards objectivity because I do think objectivity is possible, but I don't claim to have the complete picture. I kind of feel like Socratic questioning requires the assumption that there is objective truth beyond opinion.

But I hope you can see that there is, in fact, a third option- which I see as both more realistic, more accurate and more powerful- between objectivity and nihilism.

I still find it a little confusing, but I don't feel like fighting about it. I'll try to avoid appealing to objective morality on Mu for the time being.

[Fragment]

I didn't mean up all night stressed or upset, I was just turning things over in my mind. Once I start philosophizing it's hard to stop.

I won't go point by point. I might address a few of the specific questions tomorrow.

But I will just saying that it sounds like we want very different things from an ethical theory.

[PorcelainLark]

Once I start philosophizing it's hard to stop.

I know what you mean, it's what's kept me coming back to philosophy for over a decade.

I won't go point by point. I might address a few of the specific questions tomorrow.

But I will just saying that it sounds like we want very different things from an ethical theory.

Fair enough.

[aeterna91]

I agree with the premise, it would be important to have MAP celebrities. That said, I also believe that this alone will not bring about a minimally important change. No matter how popular a MAP is, they will face a "yeah, you just want to fuck kids, shut up".

What is probably even more important is to have celebrities who were AAMs at the time and are now willing to stand up for MAPs.

After all, the most popular justifications for attacking MAPs rest on the idea that every AMSC inevitably produces enormous harm to the minor involved, and a former AAM can refute that. A celebrity saying "yeah, I was the minor in that kind of relationship... and it was totally positive for me, you have been trying to brainwash me all my life to make me feel miserable and resignify that experience as something negative for me, and you haven't succeeded, because I have things clear and I know that it was something positive", that would be a powerful way to defend MAPs.

I think we ignore the tendency of populist anti-elitism at our own peril. I think if you compare the public perspective of Hilary Clinton versus Pope Francis it illustrates a significant difference. Both were targets of conspiracy theories, however Pope Francis came across as more sympathetic to the general public than Clinton. Personally, I'd be happy if it didn't matter how much you are perceived "insider" or not, but I'm not representative of the average person.

Oh, regarding this topic, I think we are also ignoring the possibilities of leveraging the discourse of conspiracy theorists to our advantage.

I mean, at the very least, it should be absolutely obvious to everyone that “child safety” and the discourse about PIM are the best excuse to control everything you do on the internet or all the information someone stores on their devices, and a conspiracy theorist should be scared of the power governments are amassing with that excuse.

And, although for some reason this does not happen, conspiracy theorists should also be more inclined to distrust the official discourse and look for alternative ways of thinking... I mean... If you can believe that they are hiding from you the true shape of the Earth, that Antarctica is a wall of ice behind which there are other civilizations or the existence of giants, perhaps you should be a little wary of what you have been told about the intrinsic damage of the AMSC., just saying...